【报告人简介】

Hikmet Günay，加拿大曼尼托巴大学经济学教授，兼任东北财经大学经济学杰出教授（Distinguished Professor of Economics），2003年获爱荷华大学经济学博士学位，并获同校数学硕士和经济学硕士学位。其研究领域涵盖产业组织、微观经济学、经济理论与博弈论，当前研究重点为序贯拍卖，也在社会学习、战略等待、企业并购等方向持续开展研究，相关成果发表于Journal of Economic Theory、International Journal of Industrial Organization、Journal of Corporate Finance、Canadian Journal of Economics、Economic Theory、Review of International Economics 等期刊。

【内容摘要】

Global bidders in sequential auctions face exposure risk when bidding for complementary goods whose values di er in uncertainty. We study how auction order affects this risk in a sequential second-price auction with heterogeneous products, where one good has relatively high valuation variance and the other has low valuation variance. Motivated by simulation-based comparative statics infinite-variance environments, we use laboratory experiments to examine whether auctioning the low-variance good first increases the likelihood of ex-post losses for global bidders. We find that negative payoffs occur significantly more often when the low-variance product is sold first, across both low- and high-synergy environments. Efficiency and revenue are primarily driven by the level of synergy and are not systematically influenced by order. We also document systematic overbidding that depends on auction order and interim outcomes, with bidding behavior differing sharply depending on whether bidders win or lose the first product.

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撰稿：王杰 审核：崔惠玉 郭晓丹 单位：高等经济研究院 产业组织与企业组织研究中心