ISCA明哲论坛：NO. 139 The Blame Game in Responsible Sourcing: Does Information Asymmetry Fuel Unauthorized Subcontracting? -- 活动 -- 东北财经大学

【报告人简介】

周宇，重庆大学经济与工商管理学院教授、博士生导师、供应链管理与市场营销系主任，国家级青年人才。研究兴趣包括但不限于新技术运营管理、技术密集型供应链管理、“人—技”可持续发展。研究成果发表于Management Science、MSOM、POM、管理科学学报等国内外学术期刊，连续入选“爱思唯尔中国高被引学者”以及“全球前2%顶尖科学家”。

【摘要】

As consumers increasingly care about how products are manufactured, many global brands have adopted responsible sourcing practices and committed to working with socially and environmentally responsible suppliers. Nevertheless, scandals involving unauthorized subcontracting remain widespread. When such incidents occur, global brands often attribute them to information asymmetry, arguing that suppliers possess private information and therefore cannot be perfectly monitored. Motivated by this phenomenon, we develop a game-theoretic model to examine how information asymmetry affects sourcing decisions and unauthorized subcontracting in supply chains. Contrary to conventional wisdom, we find that information asymmetry does not necessarily increase unauthorized subcontracting. While it may indeed exacerbate hidden subcontracting in some cases, it may also reduce it through two fundamentally different mechanisms. As a result, unauthorized subcontracting may arise not merely from suppliers' private information, but also from strategically designed sourcing contracts. Our findings offer new insights into responsible sourcing, supply chain transparency, and the allocation of responsibility for sustainability failures in global supply chains.

撰稿：王戈审核：许建军单位：现代供应链管理研究院

学校概况

院系设置

人才培养

科学研究

合作交流

公共服务