报告题目：Carbon leakage: Grandfathering as an incentive device to avert firm relocation
报 告 人：黄紫雯
报告时间： 2025年10月31日（周五）14:00-15:30
报告地点：博学楼402-2（产组中心会议室）
主办单位：产业组织与企业组织研究中心
【内容摘要】
Emission allowances are sometimes distributed for free in an early phase of a cap-and-trade scheme to reduce adverse effects on the profitability of firms. This paper investigates whether grandfathering can also be used to avert the relocation of firms to countries with lower carbon prices. We show that under certain conditions, relocation can be averted in the long run, even if the grandfathering scheme is phased out over time and immediate relocation is profitable in its absence. This requires that the permit price triggers sufficient investments into low-carbon technologies or abatement capital that create a lock-in effect which makes relocation unprofitable.
【文章信息】
Schmidt C R, Heitzig J. 2014, Carbon leakage: Grandfathering as an incentive device to avert firm relocation, Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, 67(2):209-223.
撰稿：宁浩凯 审核：郭晓丹 单位：产业组织与企业组织研究中心
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