报告题目：Strategic delegation under price competition and network effects
报 告 人：潘楠
报告时间： 2025年09月19日（周五）14:00-15:30
报告地点：博学楼402-2（产组中心会议室）
主办单位：产业组织与企业组织研究中心
【内容摘要】
Fershtman and Judd (1987) and Sklivas (1987) have shown that strategic delegation under price competition makes firm owners choose incentive contracts that induce managers to be soft in order to reduce competitive intensity. We show in a worked-out example that under sufficiently strong network effects this result is reversed, i.e. the mode of strategic delegation in general depends on more variables apart from whether managers’ strategies are complements or substitutes.
【文章信息】
Hoernig,S. 2012, Strategic delegation under price competition and network effects, Economics letters, 117(2):487-489.
撰稿：张路 审核：郭晓丹 单位：产业组织与企业组织研究中心
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